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It is a great pleasure and honor to be asked to comment on papers by Professors David Baldus and Bill Bowers and their collaborators.' Professors Baldus and Bowers are two of the most important
and influential researchers on issues of race and capital sentencing,
and I have long admired their work. I thank the University of PennsylvaniaJournalof ConstitutionalLaw for giving me this opportunity, and
for organizing such an interesting and provocative symposium.
I must say, my first impression on reading the results of the two
studies presented at the symposium was a profound lack of surprise.
The studies document phenomena that as a lawyer I always assumed
and that as an academic I always feared to be true. Of course, as my
co-commentator Professor Sam Gross aptly noted, sometimes "what
everybody knows" turns out to be completely false. But in this case,
the studies reported by Professors Baldus and Bowers have painstakingly documented some painful pieces of received wisdom. Professor
Bowers's study-part of the valuable work done by the Capital Jury
Project-tells us that black and white jurors often vote differently
from one another in capital sentencing, and that this effect is most
pronounced in cases involving black defendants and white victims.!
Given that black and white Americans vote differently in politics and
on polls of just about every stripe,3 this racial divide in the highly
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charged arena of cross-racial capital trials is hardly surprising.' Professor Baldus's study is similarly unsurprising in its results. Professor
Baldus reports that prosecutors and defense lawyers (accurately) perceive the very sort of racial divisions that the Bowers study documents, and that they use their peremptory challenges accordingly?
Also unsurprising is the Baldus study's conclusion that the Supreme
Court's attempt to prohibit racial and gender-based discrimination in
the use of peremptory strikes has had some-but only quite modestimpact on lawyers' behavior, given the lawyers' perceived incentives
and their likelihood of actually being sanctioned for violations." Less
widely anticipated-indeed, perhaps entirely unanticipated-is Professor Baldus's documentation of the comparative advantage that
prosecutors have in jurisdictions like Philadelphia, where the "prime
targets" for prosecutorial use of peremptory strikes are considerably
smaller in number than the "prime targets" for defense peremptories.7 This disparity in peremptory power leads Baldus and his colleagues to consider a number of reforms to the law and practice regarding peremptory strikes."
Not being an empirical researcher or statistician myself, I %ill not
attempt to analyze or comment upon the research methodology of
the two studies; rather, I will turn my attention to the legal implications of the studies' findings, assuming their validity. What should
the law's response be to studies of this kind? What should we do?
One obvious way to go-and, indeed, Professor Baldus explicitly
leads us there-is to think about how to structure the jury selection
process so as to preserve, insofar as possible, the representativeness of
the resultingjury. Professor Baldus considers reforms of the law and
practice of peremptory strikes that are geared toward minimizing or
preventing the skewing of capital juries away from minority representation in jurisdictions such as Philadelphia.' Presumably, Professor
Bowers would applaud such efforts as well, given his study's finding of
the effect of black jurors on outcomes in capital trials, particularly
those involving inter-racial murders.'Y This focus on restructuring
jury selection is quite natural and sensible. After all, our commitment to juries rather than judges-for criminal trials in general, and
cept Trumps Pradiue, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at A4 (Opinion Research Corp. International
poll showing that blacks and whites differed on value of diversity); John L Mitchell & Sandy
Banks, IVearying Realities of RaceAgain Hit Home: Latest Simpson Ilrdids Sptlight a Cap That Stubborly Refses to Close Diverse Readions Refltr Issues' Painful Complemzt. L_. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997,
at Al (Gallup poll revealing large racial divide in perceptions of OJ. Simpson's guilt or innocence in the murder case in which he was acquitted).
4 See, eg., Baldus et. al., supra note 1, at 52.
5 Id at 48-57.
6 Id.at 68-91.
7 Id at 57-60.
at 107-16.
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for capital sentencing in particular-arises at least in part from the
capacity of multi-memberjuries to represent the community through
their very plurality in a way that a single judge necessarily cannot.
Thus, one important project a reformer might initiate in light of the
results of the Bowers and Baldus studies is an attempt, through law, to
prevent jury composition from being systematically skewed away from
minority representation.
Indeed, a great deal of the legal literature on race and criminal
justice focuses on this or related questions already. Many academics,
judges, and policy-makers have debated whether peremptory strikes
ought to be eliminated entirely, as Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested in his concurrence in Batson v. Kentucky." Others have focused
on the inefficacy of Batson in combating intentional racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges; they suggest additional or
alternative remedies, such as more stringent self-imposed ethical
standards for prosecutors and trial court judges2 or peremptory challenges that are "blind" to race and based on written instead of live
voir dire.' 3 Still others have urged the revitalization of the Sixth
Amendment's "fair cross-section" requirement as an important addition to the Equal Protection Clause to combat racial discrimination in
jury selection. 4 Yet others have urged that we more fundamentally
rethink jury selection practices; they suggest various affirmative
schemes to promote diverse representation rather than merely to
combat racial discrimination. 5 These representation-preserving and
representation-forcing projects are worthy of serious attention precisely because of our hope and belief that it is the representativeness
of juries-at least in part-that makes them better decision-makers
than judges in criminal cases.
But it would be a mistake if these projects became the sole legal
n Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall,J., concurring);
see also Baldus et
al., supranote 1 at 33 n.11.
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CtI.-KENT L.
REk,. 475 (1998).
13Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire
and the "Blind"Peremptoiy 29 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 981 (1996).
14 Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:
Harmless Error,Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the FairCross-Section
Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REv. 101 (1996).
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting. Selecting ImpartialJuries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 382-88 (1999) (suggesting ajury selection process drawn from electoral districting law, whereby representation would be mandated from smaller "jural districts"
representing "communities of interest" within the larger jury district); NancyJ. King, RacialJuymandering- Cancer or Cure? A ContemporaryReview of Affirmative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 707, 760-76 (1993) (supporting some forms of race-conscious jury selection procedures); Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposalto Advance Both the DeliberativeIdeal
and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161 (promoting a scheme of "affirmative selection"
whereby each party to a criminal case would be able to use "affirmative" peremptories to include a certain number of already qualified jurors on the jury panel, which would then be subject to a smaller number of traditional peremptory challenges from each side).
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strategy inspired by the work of Professors Baldus and Bowers, for a
number of reasons. First, even in the worlds dreamed about by many
of the jury representation reformers, it will not always be possible to
achieve the optimal representation they envision. After all, jury districts are not always particularly diverse themselves, and the luck of
the venire will sometimes create anomalies even in diverse districts,
even in the complete absence of systematic skewing of the pool or intentional discrimination in the selection process. Moreover, it is not
by any means evident that representation that "looks like the jury district" or "looks like America" will be representation that has much effect on verdicts, given the "dominance effects" observed in Professor
Bowers's study. 6 Finally, jury representativeness, even when achieved,
is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for deliberation
informed by the airing of diverse views. As Professor Bowers's qualitative data show, minority voices may be overwhelmed in the heated
context of capital trials, or racial tensions may lead jurors to feel confirmed in their own pre-existing stereotypes of jurors of other races.
So representation-preserving and representation-forcing legal strategies have their limits as methods for promoting the distinctive benefits ofjury decision-making in capital trials.
Despite these limits, considerably less of the legal literature explores strategies beyond representation to deal with the issues raised
by observed "race effects" in capital jury decision-making. I want to
use this opportunity to begin a discussion about what alternative
strategies we might imagine-not only because of the limits of representation as a means of promoting fairer decision-making, but also
because representation is not the only point ofjuries in either criminal
trials or capital sentencings. Our commitment to juries stems not
only from what jurors, in their representational capacity, can bring to
the decision-making process, but also from what we hope they, the
jurors, will take from it. Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most perceptive nineteenth-century analysts of the relatively new institutions
of the fledgling American republic, saw that the American jury was
"above all, a political institution" that "raises the people itself, or at
least a class of citizens, to the bench of judges" and "invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the direction of society." 7 This crucial aspect of the jury--its relationship to the ideal of selfgovernment-makes it a means as well as an end in itself. As
Tocqueville realized, the jury "may be regarded as a gratuitous public
school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights,"' because
the jury, "which is the most energetic means of making the people
rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it how to rule
16
17
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1 ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.\tERicQ 293 (Francis Bowen trans. 1862) (Phil-
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well." 9 Tocqueville's observations remain pertinent today: jury service is one of the primary lessons in self-governance that our public institutions offer. Moreover, in our increasingly diverse polity, jury trials are one of the few opportunities for people from different races
and classes to come together and interact as equal participants in a
meaningful project.
What can we do to better educate our jurors in this free public
school that is the jury--not only so that they will do a betterjob at the
task at hand (here, the crucial job of capital sentencing), but also so
that they will bring something other than deepened racial hostility
away from the jury room?
This is no easy task, and there is no simple solution to the problem of racial polarization in jury deliberations, particularly with regard to capital sentencing. But we are not without options. Consider, as an analogy, the use of expert testimony and cautionary jury
instructions on the issue of the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness
identifications. The work of researchers like Elizabeth Loftus has
demonstrated that despite the high confidence eyewitnesses have in
their identifications, cross-racial identifications as a class are less reliable than same-race identifications. 0 As a result, courts often permit
the introduction of expert testimony to combat the natural confidence in, and reliance upon, cross-racial identifications by juries in
criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, such as my home state of Massachusetts, trial judges have discretion to give cautionary instructions
on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications, even in the absence
of expert testimony.' These legal strategies are meant to correct jurors' misperceptions about the meaning of certain evidence and thus
to prevent miscarriages ofjustice.
What can we learn about capital trials from these cross-racial eyewitness identification strategies? In the capital sentencing context,
we want to undermine jurors' confidence not in the meaning of certain evidence, but rather in their own perceptions and judgments,
which are inevitably and powerfully shaped by their race. We want
and need to have jurors searchingly examine and question their own
presuppositions about the world and open their minds to listen to the
alternative assumptions that likely also inhabit the jury room. Some
capital sentencing schemes-like the federal death penalty statuteseek to defeat racial polarization in capital sentencing by asking each
juror to certify that his or her final determination is not based on the
"race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant
Id. at 297.
See generally RobertJ. Hallisey, Expert Eyewitness Testimony in Court-A Short HistoricalPerspective, 39 HOw. L.J. 237, 245-47 (1995).
21 Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168,
1171 (Mass. 1995) (explicitly acknowledging
trial judges' discretion to give cautionary instructions on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications, though finding no error in the failure to give such an instruction in the case in question).
19
20

Feb. 2001]

PROPOSEDINSTRUCTION

or the victim. " 2' But such certifications are likely extremely ineffectual, because it seems probable that many of our deepest and most
powerful racially influenced presuppositions are not the products of
conscious thought, but rather habits developed over a lifetime. A
better way to seek to upset or call into question such presuppositions
might be the introduction of expert testimony on the general effects
of juror race on capital sentencing combined ith strong cautionary
instructions from the trial judge.
It is not enough, however, for judges to exhort jurors to set aside
their racial presuppositions, because jurors may very well be unau-are
of what, exactly, those presuppositions might be. I therefore urge defense lawyers to request and trial judges, at least in inter-racial capital
cases, to give instructions that ask jurors to do a "race-sitching" exercise-that is, to imagine their evaluation of the evidence if the races
of the defendant and the victim were reversed. This exercise, it must
be warned, is not meant to suggest that whatever result the jurors
would reach in the switched-race context is an) more correct, or free
from racial presuppositions, than their initial judgment. Rather, the
exercise is meant to get each juror to reflect upon and to encourage
his or her colleagues to reflect upon the role of race in their perceptions of the world. The idea behind such an instruction is that it is
impossible to remove race and its influence upon jurors' perceptions
from the jury room; the best we can hope for is that jury service will
be a means for jurors to grapple sincerely with their own limited perspectives and to attempt to open themselves up to new ones. I am
emboldened in this project by some of the data from Professor Bowers's study, data that reveal that although there is great racial polarization through the trial and the first vote on sentencing, there is also
tremendous movement by both white and black jurors during sentencing deliberations, so that the final results are much less polarized

than any of the votes that came before.s Something is happening
during deliberation, and it is that fragile process that my suggestion
seeks to nurture.
A model instruction might sound something like the folloing:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, as you heard in evidence at trial [if
there was expert testimony admitted], studies have showvn what you might
have suspected in your hearts to be true: race plays a role in how jurors
perceive evidence and how they vote in capital sentencing hearings, both
their own race and the race of the defendants and %ictimsin the cases be21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1).

Bowers, supra note 1, at 197-98 tbl. 2. The data show that at the most racially polarized
point of the capital process--the first vote on punishment-67.3% of %vhitejurorsfavored death
as compared to only 8.6% of blackjurors. Conversely, at the same point. 71.4% of blackjurors
favored life, as compared to only 26.9% ofwhitejurors. At the final vote on punishment. however, white jurors for death had dropped to only 41.8% and black jurors for death had risen to
30.6%, whereas blackjurors for life had dropped to 69.4, while white jurors for life had risen
dramatically (more than doubled) to 58.2%.
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fore them.
You may well believe that this is not true of you, because you sincerely
find your heart free of overt racial hatred or bias. But our race and the
road upon which it takes us in the world necessarily affects us in ways that
we cannot completely see or know.
You have sworn to decide the case before you without fear or favor. In
order to help you to do this, I ask you collectively to perform an exercise
in the jury room. I ask each of you to imagine your reaction to the evidence presented in this case if the races of the defendant and the victim
were reversed. I do not ask you to do this in order to suggest to you that
your decision under the conditions of the exercise is any more correct
than your decision under the conditions as they actually exist. Rather, I
ask you to perform this exercise in order to encourage you to reflect
upon-and to urge the other members of the jury to reflect upon-the
effect of race upon your perceptions of the evidence before you.
I ask each of you to listen carefully and respectfully to each other's views,
particularly the views ofjurors whose race is different from your own. If
there are no jurors whose race is different from your own on the jury, try
as best you can to imagine what such ajuror might say to you.
It is my hope that this exercise will help you return a verdict in which you
can confidently assert that racial bias-either conscious or unconsciousplays no part.

More than fifty years ago, Jerome Frank called prejudice "the thirteenth juror."2 4 Today, in light of the important work of empirical researchers like Professors Baldus and Bowers, we can see that race is
often the thirteenth juror, silent and invisible at the table of deliberations. Minority representation on juries alone is not enough to promote the crucial ends of jury participation in capital sentencing.
Rather, we need to tear away the silence and invisibility surrounding
the issue of race and force our juries to confront it head on. This is
no magic bullet; there is no guarantee that such confrontations will
reduce, as opposed to exacerbate, existing racial tensions and polarization. But the legal instructions that jurors receive, as Tocqueville
evocatively explained, are part of their rare and valuable tutelage in
self-government as a diverse people. Such instruction may just be our
best hope for racial justice-not just in capital sentencing, but outside the jury room as well.

24 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir. 1946) (FrankJ, dissenting) ("A keen observer has said that 'next to perjury, prejudice is the main cause of miscarriages of justice.' If government counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by
irrelevantly arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a lethal
weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He should not be permitted to
summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice.") (footnotes omitted).

